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The Penal Question 
 
We are in the midst of the latest and perhaps most radical reconfiguration of the penal state in 
the UK. Such changes are permeating all aspects of the landscape and calling the very 
legitimacy of the ‘system’ into question. From transformations in judicial sentencing policy to 
the ‘hollowing out’ of probation and the ‘crisis’ of the custodial estate and rehabilitation, recent 
developments have heralded an unprecedented disruption of policy, practice and political 
discourse. Whatever happened to the promises of fresh thinking encapsulated by the Coalition 
government’s ‘rehabilitation revolution’? In its place we have witnessed greater levels of 
prison overcrowding, mass court closures (including the introduction of a digital justice 
platform) and the highly contentious introduction of the private sector into probation services. 
What impact are these developments having on the initiation, formulation and implementation 
of penal policy? How can we further our theoretical understandings of what is unfolding?  
While PQ has rarely grappled with such issues, it is possible to trace an interesting – albeit 
sporadic – penal commentary over the past eighty years. Articles have variously debated issues 
of concern to criminologists, including the increase of crime in England (1932), developments 
in criminal justice (1941), party orientations in penal policy (1978), the influence of law and 
order (1979), mechanisms for advising the government on penal policy issues (1979) and the 
privatisation of punishment (1988).i With limited focus on penal policy in the mainstream 
political journals, the discipline of criminology has also paid less attention to the policy 
process. Ismaili has argued that this is because criminologists have tended to focus their 
research on the effects of successive policies rather than their origins while political science 
has largely neglected the field of crime control.ii Yet awareness of this omission is not new. 
Over thirty years ago, Solomon argued that it was important for researchers to study the 
criminal justice policymaking process to explore the constraints it places on the translation of 
ideas and analysis into action; to describe the degree to which various actors influence the 
movement of criminal justice proposals through the policy process; and to provide insight into 
how politics determines what is and can be implemented.iii Solomon’s calls have certainly not 
fallen on deaf ears, with recent years heralding a renewed criminological interest in the policy 
process.  
 
This, perhaps overdue, Special Issue comprises of a number articles debating a wide range of 
penal controversies. In addition to debating the current drivers to penal policy and prison 
reform, articles also explore more contemporary justice transformations such as developments 
in summary justice and the digitisation agenda, the changing role of the charity sector, the 
treatment of women in the penal system, the changing status of the victim, and the role of the 
media in this process.  
 
From Principled Pragmatism to New Penal Governance 
This introduction does not attempt to provide a potted history of Post-War penal policymaking 
in the UK (as this has been expertly documented elsewhere). However, in setting the context 
of this Special Issue, it is worth briefly highlighting several important milestones that have 
contributed to current penal controversies.  
It is widely recognised that the Post-War climate within which penal policy was designed was 
one of principled pragmatismiv. Experts (including civil servants, academics and prominent 
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campaign groups such as The Howard League for Penal Reform) worked with government 
Ministers behind closed doors to pursue policies according to ‘civilised values’. The 
overarching ideology during this period was that of penal-welfarism; a belief that the state had 
a role to play in the rehabilitation of offenders who had been wronged by societal ills that were 
beyond their control. There is not the space or scope in this introduction to explain why 
rehabilitation collapsed in the late 1970s, but it’s demise garnered support from both the 
political right and left. There had been a growing realisation that purely rehabilitative measures 
had not substantially reduced the crime rate and that some forms of rehabilitation (under the 
name of ‘treatment’) were exploitative and inhumane. Others highlighted the fact that keeping 
offenders incarcerated until they could prove they were ‘fixed’ was both disproportionate and 
unjust.  
In his text The Coming Penal Crisis of 1980, Anthony Bottoms warned of ‘a serious likelihood 
of a vacuum in penal thought’ following the collapse of the rehabilitative ideal and proposed 
several possible avenues for the future of penal policy. This ‘vacuum’ was soon plugged by the 
‘justice model’ that was set to dominate penal policy in the UK and across the Atlantic during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Aligned to Thatcher’s ‘back to basics’ campaign, the following decades 
oversaw an unashamedly punitive drive in penal policy, with more people sent to prison, and 
for longer. This law and order ideology permeated all aspects of the criminal justice system, 
drawing more women, the vulnerable and the young into its remit. The traditional ways of 
developing policy – encompassing the characteristics of old public administration (centrally 
determined rules, a strong central bureaucracy, policy stability, expert advice and academic 
research) - did not suit the wider political, social and economic developments of this neo-liberal 
era.v Those liberal-minded experts who had previously enjoyed insider access to the corridors 
of power were set to receive a ‘handbagging’.  
Previously focused on ‘reforming the offender’, the new discourse was concerned with the 
‘management of risk’. The move towards managerialism as the new guiding principle certainly 
‘serve[d] to reinforce pragmatic expediency’.vi Key elements of the project (competition, 
contracting-out, performance management, measurement and evaluation) heralded the 
beginnings of radical transformations to the penal sphere. New Labour carried on where the 
Conservatives left off, and continued managerialist reforms through its ‘modernising agenda’. 
In addition to prison privatisation, other criminal justice services (such as prisoner 
transportation and electronic monitoring) were soon contracted out to the private companies 
now widely recognised as penal stakeholders (G4S, Serco and Sodexo). While certain aspects 
were certainly to be welcomed (the setting of clear objectives and ensuring value for money), 
the new guiding principle was criticised for the bureaucratic burden that it placed on criminal 
justice practitioners.  
Some have gone further to argue that the central tenets of new public management – 
competition among suppliers to drive down costs in the hope of attracting customers – are 
fundamentally incompatible with the penal field. The ‘customers’ in this context are (more 
often than not) offenders who have no choice but to engage with services (compelled to do so 
by an order of the court). The improvement of standards seems less necessary in this case (even 
more so when considering public reactions to this unpopular demographic), although the 
cutting of costs (in the form of front-line workers or rehabilitative services, for example) is 
undoubtedly short-termist when considering the collective harms to society when services fall 
short.  
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Theoretical conceptions of the state have since moved from the language of new public 
management to that of new public governance. New public governance has a wider 
interpretation to recognise all forms of collaboration between national and local government, 
private and charitable providers. It consequently views the state as ‘an interaction of multiple 
stakeholders, each of whom has some public responsibility to influence and shape decisions in 
the public sphere’.vii Managing such networks often involves conflict resolution (as different 
stakeholders have competing aims and ideologies) and is important on several levels. 
‘Managers’ (in this case the Ministry of Justice) become ‘brokers’viii and must ensure that 
decision-making is shared, accountability is shared, and that goals and plans become 
coordinated.ix Such ‘brokerage’ is undoubtedly challenging in the penal field where state 
organisations operate in collaboration with a growing number of ideologically diverse 
stakeholders. The voluntary and charitable sector often finds itself at odds with the private for-
profit providers, reflecting the fundamental incompatibility of their goals and modes of 
operation. 
In common with other areas of the public sector, the modern penal state can therefore be 
characterised as decentralised (administered through arms-length bodies), fragmented (through 
more outsourcing, more contracting out and more partnership-working with private and 
voluntary providers) and fiscally-motivated. The past fifty years have seen a change in focus 
from penal welfarism to offender management to new forms of network management. Such 
developments have obvious implications for legitimacy, accountability and risk, particularly 
pertinent in the penal field.   
 
Coalition Penal Policy and Beyond…  
The Open Public Services white paper of 2011 highlighted the government’s commitment to 
the principles of new public governance and made reference to some of its penal plans. In it, 
the government stated that it had no ‘ideological presumption that only one sector should run 
services: high quality services can be provided by the public sector, the voluntary and 
community sector, or the private sector’. It went on to state that ‘wherever possible, public 
services should be open to a range of providers competing to offer a better service’ and that 
‘the forthcoming competition strategy for offender provision will aim to open up the market 
further to both private and VCSE providers’.x  
The election of 2010 undoubtedly provided a policy window for those hoping to witness a new 
direction in penal policy. The first Justice Secretary, Ken Clarke, promised sensible, pragmatic 
thinking that would withstand populist sentiment and tabloid pressures. Reformers were 
optimistic, and felt that coalition politics would produce more balanced policy than if one party 
were ruling alone. Indeed, the commitment to collaboration was reflected in the Ministerial 
make-up of the Ministry of Justice, with several Liberal Democrat politicians assuming senior 
roles.  
Announcing that fewer young people would be sent to custody and that those with mental 
health or addiction problems would receive specialist help in the community, Clarke’s vision 
for a ‘rehabilitation revolution’ certainly injected some hope into a stagnant penal agenda. Yet 
this renewed focus on rehabilitation came hand in hand with other, managerialist 
developments. As highlighted in the Open Public Services white paper, criminal justice 
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services were to be commissioned competitively from a variety of providers in the public, 
private and voluntary sectors on a basis of payment by results. The management of prisons 
(including the financing of all new ones) would also continue to be contracted out. Clarke was 
unable to oversee the implementation of his policy plans, however. In a direct reaction to 
increasing frustrations among party members he was removed from office in 2012 and replaced 
by ‘attack dog’ Chris Grayling. The language of the ‘rehabilitation revolution’, it seemed, had 
not washed with the party faithful. Grayling, unashamedly punitive in his approach, was 
appointed to rescue a department that was seen as lacking traditional ‘Conservative’ conviction. 
Unlike Clarke, Grayling was more populist in his rhetoric, publicly campaigning to remove 
prisoners’ rights to vote and ‘luxuries’ such as television and computer games. Clarke’s legacy 
did continue, however, and his early visions formed the basis of the Transforming 
Rehabilitation agenda, enshrined in the Offender Rehabilitation Act of 2014. 
A recipient of one of the biggest budget cuts in government, the Ministry of Justice (and its 
executive agencies) was subsequently forced to undergo radical restructuring during the period 
of imposed austerity. The department framed its actions under the banner of ‘Transforming 
Justice’, but in reality this represented an urgent need to cut costs, streamline provision, and 
contract out services where possible.  
Fundamental changes resulted in a busy legislative agenda.xi The Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act received Royal Assent in 2012. The Act contained a 
number of measures relating to the toughening up of sentencing, bail and remand, release on 
licence and Out of Court Disposals. Its headline measure, however, related to the changes in 
legal aid eligibility, and the government’s intention to bring an end to the ‘compensation 
culture’. The Crime and Courts Act, a relatively niche piece of legislation, was passed the 
following year. It introduced a number of measures geared at fighting organised crime 
(including border policing, cybercrime and child sexual exploitation) and established the 
National Crime Agency.  
More changes came in the form of the Offender Rehabilitation Act of 2014, however.  The 
legislation contained two headline measures: (1) the focus on rehabilitation made it a 
requirement that all those released from short term prison sentences (under one year) would be 
supervised in the community for 12 months (thus attempting to ‘break the cycle’), and (2) the 
management of low and medium level offenders in the community was to be contracted out to 
the private sector, thus splitting the existing probation service into two. The newly-reformed 
National Probation Service (NPS) would continue to supervise those assessed to be the highest 
risk.  
The implementation of the second measure has been highly controversial, and has permeated 
the very core of modern probation work. There are currently twenty-one Community 
Rehabilitation Companies (mostly run by the private sector, with a small number administered 
by staff mutuals) that run probation services for low and medium risk offenders in the 
community, with their performance measured according to their ability to reduce reoffending 
rates. A key ‘selling point’ of the new system was that it would result in a rising of standards 
and greater innovation. Such improvements have yet to be seen, however, with successive 
reports highlighting a range of issues (including reduced staffing, increasing caseloads, a 
reduction in funded services and tensions between the those working for the NPS and private 
companies).  
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Despite the overarching rhetoric of a ‘rehabilitation revolution’, legislative developments 
during the Coalition era were largely punitive in nature: they strengthened the power of the 
courts, the police and the prison service while the return to ‘rehabilitation’ was ‘inscribed in a 
framework of risk rather than a framework of welfare’.xii  
Following the election of 2015, the Conservative party has continued with the reform agenda 
apace. The Criminal Justice and Courts Act, passed that year, introduced a number of measures 
relating to sentencing and punishment, but it was mostly associated with the introduction of 
the criminal courts charge. Viewed by the government as a method to collect revenue from 
offenders (who were forced to pay between £150 and £1,200 towards the cost of their case), 
this highly unpopular measure led to mass resignations from magistrates and growing calls 
from lobbyists who argued that it was both disproportionate and ineffective. The policy was 
quickly scrapped by Justice Secretary Michael Gove later that same year.  
A major development came in the form of a keynote speech by Prime Minister David Cameron 
in Spring 2016. Touted as the first major speech on prison reform by a Premier in 20 years, it 
was supposed to inaugurate the great prison reform agenda. Given Cameron’s Commons 
majority and the widespread support that it received from the sector, it could certainly be 
viewed as an open policy window. Plans quickly crumbled, however, following the EU 
referendum later that year, confirming the deeply damaging 'see saw' nature of policy in this 
highly politicised area. 
At the time of writing, the Prisons and Courts Bill, published in the wake of mass disturbances 
on the prison estate, has currently been shelved following the General Election of 2017. The 
Bill promised a number of measures relating to increased prison governor accountability and 
the establishment of a number of ‘reform prisons’ but also intended to introduce fundamental 
developments in ‘digital justice’. Given the vast amount of focus that the government has 
placed on administrative court reform (and in the face of mass court closures), it is unlikely 
that the digitisation plans will remain shelved for long. Continued unrest in our prisons means 
that the need for fundamental reform remains equally high on the agenda. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether the government will place the same priority on the prison reform agenda 
now that we have entered the era of Brexit politics. It may be that the policy window has now 
closed (for now at least), and that the justice agenda will now be dominated by the politics of 
terrorism, immigration and a recalibration of human rights. This Special Issue is our collective 
attempt to make sense of what is going on.  
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